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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a dismissal of fourteen counts
of theft, all class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in
and for Garfield County, State of Utah, the Honorable Don V.
Tibbs, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992) and Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented in this appeal is:
1.

Did the trial court properly grant defendant's

motion for a directed verdict, finding that the State had failed
to present "some evidence," sufficient to make a prima facie case
of theft?

"In directing a verdict, the court is not free to

weigh the evidence and thus invade the province of the jury,
whose prerogative it is to judge the facts. A directed verdict
is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a

matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the
facts to be determined from the evidence presented.

[The

appellate] Court's standard of review of a directed verdict is
the same as that imposed upon the trial court.

[The appellate

court] must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would
support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed
verdict cannot be sustained."

Management Committee, etc. v.

Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982) (footnotes
omitted).

The trial court's determination concerning a motion to

dismiss or for a directed verdict is a question of law.

State v.

Rivenburqh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 110, 355 P.2d 689, 698-99 (1960),
cert, denied, 386 U.S. 922, 82 S* Ct. 246 (1961).

The trial

court's legal conclusion is not accorded any particular deference
and is reviewed for its correctness.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990), cert, denied. 111 S.
Ct. 120 (1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Addendum A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Thomas C. Jackson, was charged by amended
information with eighteen counts of theft, all class B
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990)
2

(R. 84-89).

At defendant's jury trial, counts I and II were

dismissed with prejudice by stipulation (Order of dismissal,
hereinafter "order," R. 152, attached at Addendum A; T. 70).
Counts XVI and XVII were dismissed because evidence showed that
property alleged to have been taken was inaccessible to defendant
(R. 152-53; T. 200-02).

The trial court granted defendant's

motion for a directed verdict on the remaining counts, finding
that the State failed to present a prima facie case of theft
against defendant (R. 153; T. 200-05).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was hired in early August 1990 as a laborer
by Harper Construction Company, which was then doing work on the
Burr Trail outside of Boulder and Escalante, Utah (T. 123).
Approximately one and one-half weeks later he was hired as a
security guard by the company at $7.00 per hour without
"subsistence," i.e., travel expenses (T. 124-26).

His shift ran

from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. (T. 127).
A couple of hours before dark on the last Saturday of
September 1990, Grant Johnson drove up to the jobsite on a
motorcycle with Harper employee Susan Ferron seated behind him
(T. 85-86, 115). They saw defendant standing between his truck
and horse trailer (pictured in State's Ex. 1 and 2), which were
parallel to a diesel fuel tanker (pictured in State's Ex. 4),
with the nozzle from the tanker fuel hose in his hands (T. 87,
115).

Johnson testified that defendant was holding the hose in

the horse trailer and that when defendant observed he and Ferron

3

approaching, defendant withrew the hose from the trailer and
threw it to the ground (T. 115-16).

Although neither Johnson and

Ferron saw fuel coming from the nozzle nor heard the tanker fuel
pump running, Johnson observed defendant reach around to the
front of the tanker where the pump was located (T. 98, 103-04,
116, 119). On cross examination Ferron noted that when the pump
was running the fuel came out of the hose really fast and that
she was not aware of any fuel around (T. 96, 102). They also
both testified that the hose nozzle appeared too large to fit
into the tank of an ordinary pickup truck (T. 96, 120).
Ferron had seen defendant pull his horse trailer to
work on many occasions, though only once carrying horses (T. 92).
She was not aware at the time she witnessed defendant's acts that
he had a fuel tank in the back of his horse trailer (T. 90).
When she was told about the tank, she told Donald Haws,
superintendent for Harper, about what she and Johnson had seen
(T. 91).
Haws did not immediately confront defendant, wanting
instead to catch him in the act of stealing (T. 129). On January
9, 1991, at about 8:00 p.m., Haws and Billie Jones drove onto the
jobsite in one of the company diesel trucks (T. 130, 154, 172).
They saw defendant holding the fuel tanker nozzle into a funnel
inserted into the fuel tank located in the back of defendant's
horse trailer (T. 130, 154, 178). When defendant became aware of
Haws' and Jones' approaching headlights, he began to hang up the
hose on the fuel tanker.

He appeared very nervous (T. 131, 173).

4

Both witnesses testified that the pump was running (T. 131, 178).
Haws testified the sound of the pump could be heard over the
noise of the diesel truck, and upon their approach defendant was
moving to shut it off (T. 131, 154).
Jones testified that defendant was filling his fuel
tank with the fuel from the fuel tanker, although neither she nor
Haws saw fuel on defendant, and Jones did not actually see fuel
running (T. 155-56, 172, 178). However, when defendant walked up
to Haws, still seated in the truck, and Haws accused him of
"stealing fuel from us," defendant offered Haws his paycheck,
explaining that he was "stealing" six to nine gallons of fuel
because he was a poor man and could not afford to pay the fuel
cost of traveling to and from the jobsite (T. 132, 162-64, 173).
Both Haws and Jones assumed at the time that defendant's
admission of the amount of fuel he was stealing was a reference
to a daily amount, but at trial Jones appeared to acknowledge
that it was probably a reference to a weekly amount because it
would take that much to go from Escalante to the jobsite and back
(T. 163, 176). Jones thought that defendant offered his check to
cover the cost of the fuel that he had taken (T. 173, 177). On
cross examination Haws said that defendant offered him the check
because he was sorry about the mistake, but on direct examination
Haws had testified that: "[Defendant] offered me his last
paycheck to keep it quiet" (T. 162, 169). Haws refused the
check, and fired defendant (T. 132, 161).
Haws testified that only he had authority to allow an

5

employee to use fuel.

He allowed employees to use fuel in their

personal vehicles when they used them for company businessf but
only after they had come to him each time when they needed fuel
(T. 128, 139, 169). That policy was announced at the weekly
safety meetings (T. 139). Defendant was present at a safety
meeting at least one time, during his initial employment as a
laborer on the pipe crew, though apparently not thereafter when
employed as a security guard (T. 139).
Haws acknowledged, through defendant's exhibit 7, that
as much as one hundred sixty-one gallons of fuel per week, on
average during the period of defendant's employment, was given to
employees for the use of their vehicles in performing company
business (T. 141-48).

Haws approved defendant's taking a tank of

fuel on only one occasion, when defendant was using his truck to
spread pipe, carry bands and do other odds and ends (T. 128).
Also, defendant was permitted to use whatever vehicle he wanted
in his job as a security guard.

Haws acknowledged that defendant

would be entitled to receive fuel if he were using his truck for
company business, i.e., patrolling the area as security guard.
However, defendant would still have to approach Haws each time he
needed fuel (T. 141, 152). While Haws admitted the possibility
that defendant might have misunderstood him concerning his having
to come to him each time he needed fuel, he stated at several
points that he did not believe that defendant could have had such
an impression (T. 137-38, 140, 150, 169). Haws testified that
defendant never asked for fuel while he was a security guard,
6

that in negotiations for defendant's employment he (Haws) made no
agreement to provide defendant with fuel to patrol looking for
vehicles, and that he did not give defendant any continuing right
to take fuel after the first occasion on which he had allowed
defendant to take fuel (T. 168). Haws also testified that for
all he knew, defendant's truck was parked all night (T. 163).
After satisfying the trial court that defendant had
been properly Mirandized,1 Celeste Bernards, Garfield County
police officer, testified that defendant admitted that he had
taken between six and eight gallons of fuel per week, just what
it would take to go from Escalante to Boulder (T. 188-92).

She

also said that defendant told her that he had authority to take
fuel from several individuals, including Haws, but that she did
not believe him (T. 192, 194-195).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court made an error of law in finding that
the State had failed to make a prima facie case of theft and in
thereby dismissing counts III through XV and XVIII of the amended
information with prejudice.

The question of whether there is

sufficient evidence, i.e., "some evidence," to support a verdict
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is for the jury, not for the
trial court, in a jury trial.
In this case there was undisputed evidence that
defendant unauthorizedly took fuel from his employer to reimburse
himself for his travel expenses to and from the jobsite.
1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
7

Defendant had been hired without provision for reimbursement for
travel expenses, and he never sought nor apparently contemplated
permission to take fuel to reimburse himself for travel expenses.
Four witnesses saw defendant in circumstances which reasonably
suggested that he was taking fuel, and defendant admitted taking
fuel for travel expenses, once when caught at the fuel station,
and later when he admitted such taking to a police officer.

Such

evidence more than amply established a prima facie case of theft.
The trial court, however, was distracted by weakly
disputed evidence that defendant might reasonably have thought he
had authorization to take fuel for another purpose, i.e.,
reimbursement for performing company work while using his own
vehicle.

Even on this point the State presented sufficient

evidence to show defendant's unauthorized taking.

In any event,

this disputed question was a matter for the jury, not the trial
court.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ACTED AS FACT
FINDER IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO TAKE THE CASE TO THE JURY.
At the close of the State's case the trial court
dismissed counts XVI and XVII because evidence showed that the
fuel tanks were locked up and, therefore, inaccessible to
defendant between December 22, 1990 and January 3, 1991 (Order,
R. 152-53, attached at Addendum B; T. 200-02).

The trial court

also granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the
remaining counts, finding that the State failed to present a
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prima facie case of theft against defendant (R. 153; T. 199-206,
colloquy on motion for directed verdict, attached at Addendum C).
"A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires
the trial court to determine whether the defendant must proceed
with the introduction of evidence in his defense."

State v.

Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (citing State
v. Smith, Utah, 675 P.2d 521 (1983)).

See also Utah R. Crim. P.

17(o);2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990)3.

"In order to submit a

question to the jury, it is necessary that the prosecution
present some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause
of action."

Noren, ibid, (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216

(Utah 1976)); State v. Striebv, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App.
1990), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
"[U]pon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of
not guilty for lack of evidence [] the trial court does not
2

Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, in
pertinent part:
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by
the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all
the evidence, the court may issue an order
dismissing any information or indictment, or
any count thereof, upon the ground that the
evidence is not legally sufficient to
establish the offense charged therein or any
lesser included offense.
3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1990), provides:
When it appears to the court that there is
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to
his defense, it shall forthwith order him
discharged.
9

consider the weight of the evidence or credibility of the
witnesses, but determines the naked legal proposition of law . •
. ."

Rivenburah, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 P.2d at 698-99 (1960)

(quoting State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 186, 272 P.2d 195,
198 (1954).
"The controlling principle is that upon [a motion to
dismiss] the evidence is to be viewed most favorably to the
state, and if when so viewed, the jury acting fairly and
reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, the judge is required to submit the case to the jury for
determination of the guilt or innocence of defendant."

State v.

Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 171, 173, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (1960) (emphasis
added).
A challenge alleging insufficient evidence to warrant
sending a case to the jury is reviewed under the same standard
applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to support a
jury verdict.

State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)

(cited for this proposition in State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561,
573-74 (Utah App. 1991):

"[The appellate court] will uphold the

trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the appellate
court] concludefs] that some evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt."

Ibid, (rejecting the

defendant's claim that the trial court had erred in denying his
motion to dismiss).
10

The Utah Supreme Court has applied the same standard in
evaluating a trial court's granting of a motion for a directed
verdict:
In directing a verdict, the court is not
free to weigh the evidence and thus invade
the province of the jury, whose prerogative
it is to judge the facts. A directed verdict
is only appropriate when the court is able to
conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be
determined from the evidence presented.
[The appellate] Court's standard of
review of a directed verdict is the same as
that imposed upon the trial court. [The
appellate court] must examine the evidence in
the light most favorable to the losing party,
and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn
therefrom that would support a judgment in
favor of the losing party, the directed
verdict cannot be sustained.
Management Committee, etc.. 652 P.2d at 897-98; Cruz v. Montova,
660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983) ("Unless the evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue
which supports the plaintiff's claim, a court should not direct a
verdict for the defendant.")
Since the trial court's determination concerning a
motion to dismiss or for a directed verdict is a question of law,
Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 P.2d at 698-99, it is subject
to a correction of error standard.

City of Monticello, 788 P.2d

at 516.
In State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 (1945),
the defendant had been charged with involuntary manslaughter
stemming from an automobile accident in which there was
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conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant had recklesslycaused the accident.

The trial court granted the defendant's

motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the State's case, and the
State appealed.

In finding the evidence sufficient to make out a

prima facie case and in reversing the trial court's ruling, the
majority stated the proper functions of the trial court versus
the jury:
When different reasonable inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, the question is one
exclusively within the province of the iurv.
It is not the function of the court to
substitute its judgment on questions of fact
for that of the iurv.
Id. at 68, 157 P.2d at 260 (emphasis added).

This distinction

was developed at length in the concurring opinion of Justice
Wolfe, instructive in the instant case:
. . • The rule which must be applied upon a
motion to dismiss a criminal case is that all
reasonable inferences are to be taken in
favor of the state, and only if the record
itself reveals that no reasonable man could
draw an inference of guilt therefrom is the
trial court justified in taking the case from
the jury. No such situation is revealed by
this record.
So important is it that the above be
understood and that there be no confusion
regarding it that it may perhaps pay to
resort again to first principles. It is
common place in our system of jurisprudence
that the court decides only questions of law
and the jury questions of fact. Each has its
judging functions and each is an equally
important department of the judicial
institution we call the court. Neither is
supposed to trespass in the province of the
other. This is so fundamental that no
authority need be cited for it. In this case
it is requisite that we determine the line
separating the functions of each. Ordinarily
12

we sav that it is for the jury and not the
court to 'weigh' the evidence. That means
that where there is anv substantial evidence
to go to the jury in favor of both sides it
must go to the jury so that the iurv may put
all the evidence for one party on one scale
and balance it against the evidence for the
other party placed on the other scale.

The judge has very little to do with this
process. He determines whether offered
testimony has anv probative force, i.e.,
whether it tends to prove or disprove an
element of the case and according to that
judgment he admits or rejects it. Once
admitted it is for the jury.

There are, of course, situations under
which the case should not be submitted to a
jury. One of these would be where there was
no substantial evidence (and that does not
mean a substantial amount of evidence but
substantial in the sense of having
substance). Perhaps also in the rare case
where there can be no doubt that testimony of
all witnesses as to one or more essential
elements in the case appears from the record
to be so inherently improbable that no
reasonable man could give weight to it the
case could be taken from the jury. But 'mere
contradictions of the testimony of a witness
will not suffice to constitute inherent
improbability or to destroy its weight' so as
to justify a court in disregarding such
testimony. Perhaps in the case where there
is a mountain of evidence on one side as
against a molehill on the other all of equal
quality as shown by the record so that no
jury of reasonable men could determine
otherwise than for the preponderance the case
might be taken from the jury, but the
preponderance would have to be overwhelming.
Also in criminal cases the case may be taken
from the jury where it can be said beyond
doubt that no reasonable men could find the
defendant guilty without entertaining a
reasonable doubt.
13

In determining whether or not a case is
to go to the jury, the trial judge has no
discretion. If the evidence falls into one
of the above enumerated categories the judge
should not submit it to the jury. If the
evidence under any reasonable interpretation
would sustain a verdict of guilty, the judge
is required to let the case go to the iurv.
Id. at 74-78, 157 P.2d at 263-64 (Wolfe, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case the State presented evidence, which when
viewed most favorably for the prosecution, was amply sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of theft.

Therefore, even if

there were evidence in opposition to the State's case, the trial
court was required to deny defendant's motion for a directed
verdict and send the case to the jury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), states that M[a]
person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof."
On one occasion two witnesses saw defendant with the
fuel hose in his hand as he stood next to his horse trailer which
contained a fuel tank (T 87, 115). As the witnesses approached,
Johnson saw defendant withdraw the hose from the trailer, throw
it to the ground and immediately start talking to Ferron (T. 11516).

While neither of these witnesses heard the pump running or

observed the flow of fuel, Johnson saw defendant reach around the
front of the tanker where the fuel pump was located as they
approached (T. 98, 103-04, 116, 119). The implication of all of
14

defendant's movements suggested an intent to hide what might
reasonably be inferred from his actions, to wit: he was taking
fuel without permission.
On the second occasion two other witnesses, including
Harper's superintendent, saw defendant again standing next to his
horse trailer, holding the fuel hose into his trailer.

This time

there was a funnel in the fuel tank and the pump was running (T.
130, 154, 172, 178). As soon as defendant became aware that he
was being observed, he hung up the hose and shut off the pump (T.
131, 154, 173). When confronted directly, defendant, appearing
"very nervous," admitted taking six to nine gallons of fuel
because he was a poor man and could not afford the expense of
traveling to and from the jobsite and offered up his last
paycheck (T. 132, 162-64, 173).
The testimony was undisputed that when defendant was
hired as a security guard he was not entitled to receive
subsistence, i.e., traveling expenses to and from the jobsite (T.
125-26).

Approximately a week after his firing, he admitted to a

police officer that he had been "taking" six to eight gallons of
fuel each week of his employment only to cover the expense of his
traveling to and from the jobsite (T. 192). It is apparent, both
from the character of defendant's cross examination of the
State's witnesses and from the evidence adduced by both parties,
that defendant never contemplated as a defense that he had
authorization to take fuel for travel expenses.
There are no material facts controverting those set out

15

above, which clearly make out a prima facie case of theft, to
wit: an unauthorized taking of property with intent to deprive
the owner thereof.
Interestingly, a substantial portion of the testimony
was directed to whether defendant had authorization to take fuel
for an altogether different purpose, i.e., performing his duties
as security guard.

The amended information charged defendant

with the unauthorized taking of six to eight gallons of fuel per
week (R. 84-89).

It is obvious that the evidence supporting the

amended information were defendant's admissions, both to Haws and
to Officer Bernards, that he had taken these amounts to pay his
travel expenses to and from the jobsite.

In the face of these

admissions, evidence concerning whether or not he had
authorization to take fuel to perform his job is irrelevant and
only served to distract the trial court from defendant's
uncontested unauthorized taking of fuel for travel expenses.
Even if the question of authorization to take fuel for
work related purposes were relevant, there would have been
sufficient evidence on this point to take the case to the jury.
Only Haws could authorize the taking of fuel, and he gave
defendant permission to take fuel only once, i.e., while
defendant worked on the pipe crew and was using his truck for
company work (T. 128-29).

Defendant was present for at least one

weekly meeting in which Haws announced the company policy of
allowing fuel reimbursements for doing company work, though only
with his permission on each occasion (T. 139-41).
16

Haws'

testimony makes clear that he never contemplated that defendant
would be supplied with fuel in connection with his suseguent
duties as security guard and that defendant could not reasonably
have believed that he would be so supplied (T. 137-41, 150, 169).
Haws was doubtful that defendant did use his truck to patrol the
jobsite as security guard (T. 163), and, in fact, there was no
evidence that defendant did use his truck in this way.
In this case the trial court acted in clear
contravention of those principles defining the proper roles of a
trial court and jury outlined by Judge Wolfe in Thatcher (see
Appellant's Brief at 13-14).

Evidence of the trial court's

erroneous application of the correct legal standards was its
reliance on Jones' testimony that defendant had hung up the hose
on the second occasion, apparently sparking the trial court's
belief that defendant was not thereby exhibiting a guilty mind,
and on Haws' testimony that defendant might have made a mistake
about whether he had authorization to take fuel in working as a
security guard (T. 203-04).

Such interpretations of the evidence

were fact determinations for the jury, not the trial court.
Management Committee, etc., 652 P.2d at 897-98; Cruz v. Montova,
660 P.2d at 729.
Indeed, the trial court's evaluations were likely a
substantial misreading of the evidence.

Jones testified that

defendant "was filling his fuel tank with the fuel from the fuel
truck," that defendant did not immediately recognize their
approach and that when he did he hung up the hose (T. 172-73,

17

178).

Any reasonable juror, contrary to the trial court's

apparent belief, might have assumed that either defendant had
already completed the taking of fuel on that occasion, or that,
recognizing the approach of his boss in such uncompromising
circumstances, the wisest thing was not to try to hide one's
guilt.

Defendant's immediate walking up to Haws and his ready

offer of his paycheck suggest that his hanging up the hose
signaled an acquiescence in the discovery of his misdeeds.

As to

the trial court's seizing on the possibility of defendant's
mistaken belief about his right to take fuel to patrol the
jobsite, the record is clear that Haws was very ably badgered
into this acknowledgment by defense counsel, but that Haws
personally did not believe that defendant could reasonably
believe that he was authorized to take fuel in performance of his
security guard duties (T. 137-38, 140, 150, 169). Again, the
weight to be accorded such testimony was not for the trial court
to determine, but for the jury.

Ibid.

The clearest signal of the trial court's erroneously
depriving the jury of the opportunity to decide this case is the
trial court's statement that even if the jury were to convict
defendant, it would feel compelled to grant a motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (T. 204). Thus, the trial
court dismissed the case with prejudice on a theory which
presumed that defendant's case had already been presented to the
jury and that in spite of a possible conviction there existed no
evidence upon which defendant could have been convicted.
18

A

dismissal based on that assumption was outside the province of
the trial court.

Rivenburah, 11 Utah 2d at 110, 355 P.2d at 698-

99; Iverson, 10 Utah 2d at 173, 350 P.2d at 153; Thatcher, 108
Utah at 68, 157 P.2d at 260.
In sum, the trial court improperly perceived tis role
to be a fact finder in a jury trial, thereby curtailing a proper
assessment of the evidence. As a matter of law, the trial court
erred in dismissing with prejudice counts III through XV and
XVIII of the amended information.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal of counts III
through XV and XVIII of the amended information and to remand the
case for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7

day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to
E. Kent Winward, Garfield County Public Defender, attorney for
appellee, 36 North 300 West, Cedar City, Utah 84720, this
day of December, 1992.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea;
(b) an order made after judgment that afifects the substantial rights of
the defendant;
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution.
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from:
(a) a final judgment of dismissal;
(b) an order arresting judgment;
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of afindingof double
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial;
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid;
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evidence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
or no contest.

ADDENDUM B

MAT u i rasz
;—

Clerl

WALLACE A- LEE #5306
Garfield County Attorney
55 South Main Street
Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: 676-2290
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GARFIELD COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
Criminal No. 91-CR-309

TOM JACKSON,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for jury trial on the 19th
day

of March,

1992, the

Honorable

Don V.

Tibbs

presiding.

Defendant was present in Court and was represented by his attorney,
E. Kent Winvard.

The State of Utah was represented by Wallace A.

Lee, Garfield County Attorney.
By stipulation of Counsel, Counts I and II of the information
were dismissed with prejudice.

After the jury was impaneled and

sworn, the Court and jury heard opening statements of counsel and
testimony of witnesses for the State of Utah.

After the State of

Utah rested its case, Defendant moved for dismissal of Counts XVI
and XVII, and the motion was granted because during the period of
time covered by these two Counts, the fuel tank and equipment at

25. Confinement.
26 Fine

Restitution
Probation End Date

27. AGENCY REFERRED AP&P U
County Jail D
State Prison •
Court Probation D
Alcohol Rehab D
Mental Health n

Order

the site were locked# and Defendant could not have taken fuel from
them.
After the Court dismissed Counts XVI and XVII, the Defendant
moved for a directed verdict on the remaining counts.

After

hearing arguments of Counsel relative to the motion for directed
verdict, the Court is of the opinion that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case on any
of the remaining counts of the information.

Specifically, the

Court finds that the State of Utah did not present a prima facie
case that Defendant took unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
NOW THEREFORE, Defendants motion for a directed verdict is
granted and this case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

?fl

day of

/&>K. L

BY THE COURT:

, 1992.

ADDENDUM C
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THE COURT:

It's sustained.

MR. LEE: Okay.
MR. LEE: No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. WINWARD:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's all. Thank you.
MR. LEE: And the State rests at this time, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. You may call your first
witness.
MR. WINWARD:

Your Honor, could u/e approach the

Bench for a minute?
THE COURT:

Surely.

(OFF-RECORD BENCH CONFERENCE]
THE COURT:
send you for a walk.

Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to
Would you please walk down the hall.

Once again, again it's the duty of this Court to
admonish you you're not to talk about this case with anyone.
You're not to form or express any opinion on the case until
it's finally submitted to you.
PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE THE JURY
THE COURT:

The record should indicate we're

outside the presence of the jury.

I'll hear you, counsel.

DEFENSE JHOTION POR DIRECTED VERDICT
MR. WINWARD:

Your Honor, at this time I feel it
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i II would be appropriate, highly appropriate, to move for a

2

directed verdict at this time.

I don't think that the State

3

h a s m e t their case.

*

facie case to show that o n these 16 separate accounts that

5

M r . Jackson took 6 l o 8 gallons o f fuel.

6

to proceed o n that motion, Your Honor.

I don't think they've produced a prima

7

T H E COURT:

8

M R . WINWARD:

9

First o f all, a s far a s what t h e State's put o n at

io

G o ahead.

And I'm prepared

Proceed.

Okay.

this point, M r . Haws h a s testified t h a t — l e t m e grab the

n I information here because that's going t o b e helpful a s w e g o
12

through this.

13

[CHECKED NOTES]

14

M r . Haws testified that the tanks were locked u p

15 and that h e couldn't h a v e — M r . Jackson didn't have a key
16 11 from December 22nd to January 3rd, if I remember M r . Haws'
17 testimony right.
18

And a s far a s c o u n t s — i t looks like 1 6 ,

1 7 , both of those, both count 16 and 17 occurred during that

19 December 22nd through January 3rd period where there w a s n o
20

access to the tanks.

7\

T H E C O U R T : Mlhat about i t , counsel?

22

M R . LEE:

Your Honor, the State h a s presented

23 II evidence that's based o n t h e defendant's admission that h e
24

took fuel once a week and during the time that h e w a s

25 working o n the project.

N o w the jury doesn't have to
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convict him on all of the counts, and maybe those are counts
that they won't convict him on.

But there are some others.

There are at least four eyeu/itnesses that saw him taking
fuel, or at least circumstances evidence that he was taking
fuel on two separate observations.
As far as authorization, we have the defendant's
word against Mr. Haws# word and the jury is entitled to
decide who they1re going to believe.

They're the ones that

are going to give weight to the evidence and credibility to
the witness.

It's a jury question that should go to the

jury as to who they believe on those things. We've not had
a chance to cross examine Mr. Jackson as to what he said.
THE COURT:

Let me just ask you, counsel.

quit horsing around.

Let's

He said he couldn't have taken any gas

because they were all locked up. He didn't have the key.
I'm talking about between December 22nd and January 3rd.
MR. LEE: Well that's right, Your Honor.

Maybe

those counts ought to be dismissed, but not the whole thing.
COURT RULING
THE COURT:

I think they're dismissed.

The motion

is granted as to counts N o . —
MR. WINWARD:

Now, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Wait a minute.
THE COURT:

As to Count No. 16, Count No. 17,

based upon the testimony here, there couldn't have been a
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theft during that period of time from the evidence I've
heard.
Go ahead.
MR. WINWARD:

The other part of my motion—I mean

those two are particularly a standout and pretty straight
forward.

As for the other 14 counts, where we are at now,

the other 14 counts the State has to prove, make some kind
of showing of intent.

They have to make some kind of

showing that Mr. Jackson—there was no way that Mr. Jackson
knew that he wasn't authorized.

Mr. Haws, in his testimony,

specifically said that he never told them that he couldn't.
He said the general rule was if it was for company use, you
could use the fuel. Mr. Jackson was aware of that rule and,
in fact, had used fuel with Mr. Haws' permission, according
to his testimony, on at least one occasion.
They have no evidence of intent.

All they have is

a general rule that was out there at this employment site,
and not only that, everyone is saying that he's offering to
pay for it, if there was a misunderstanding.
nothing there for intent.

There's

There's nothing in these charges

that show intent•
The state hasn't made a prima facie case on those
claims, Your Honor.
MR. LEE: Your Honor, if I could be heard on that
THE COURT:

Go ahead.
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PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT
BY MR. LEE: Your Honorf a question of intent is
shown by the way the defendant acted each time those people
saw him.

How he pulled it out and threw it under the truck.

Why would he do that if he was authorized?

That shows he

was not authorized.
THE COURT: You got the last witness; didn't she
testify to that?

She said he took it over and put it and

hung it up.
MR. LEE: That's true, Your Honor.
also.

We have that,

But on many occasions I think we have behavior by Mr.

Jackson that indicates he wasn't authorized.

We also have

the unequivocal testimony from Mr. Don Haws and he didn't
give him authority to do that.
on one coax, Your Honor.

He says he let him have it

He also stated that he was

contract labor on the Burr Trail, that he was a security
guard and he wasn't paid subsistence for, he stated.

All

those things need to be taken under consideration by the
jury.
It's Harper's fuel. He obtained control over it.
The question is whether it was not authorized.

We have Mr.

Haws saying it was not authorized; we have Mr. Jackson
saying there was.
THE COURT: We have Mr. Haws saying this, there
could have been a mistake. He says that.

There could have
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been a mistake.

What does that do?

Let roe just ask you, counsel, suppose I let this
go to the jury and they convict him?
MR. LEE:

That's utfiat u/e are asking them to do.

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Suppose they do convict him and

then suppose they come in and make a motion for a judgment,
notwithstanding the verdict, on the basis there's not
8 II adequate evidence here to convict him under any
9

circumstances?

io

MR. LEE:

Your Honor, you'll have to make that

n

decision.

12

I'm trying the very best I can.

n

as best I can.

u
15

I don't think we're horsing around, Your Honor.
I'm trying to show the case

I think we made a prima facie case.

THE COURT:

Well, do you have anything else,

counsel?

16

MR. LEE:

Well, I think vi/e have got t o — m u s t have

17 to send it to the jury, Your Honor, and request that it be.
18

COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS

19

THE COURT:

Well, I don't.

I'm sorry, but I just

20

don't.

I feel that if I allowed the jury to take this out

21

and render a verdict on this evidence that I've heard today

22

that I would have no alternative but to dismiss the case

23

after on the basis of I've just don't think there's a prima

24

facia case.

25

heard, there's a prima facie case to believe the defendant

I just don't feel, with the evidence I've
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is guilty.

I haven't -even been convinced in my mind that

there's adequate evidence to allou/ it to go to the jury
after hearing the testimony I've had.
This case is dismissed.
way it looks to me.

I'm sorry, but that's the

Bring the jury in.

[BAILIFF RESPONDED]
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT
THE COURT:

The record should indicate the jury

has returned the parties are present with counsel.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, while you were
out there has been a motion made before the Court and I have
conscientiously listened to the motions.

In my opinion

there's not adequate evidence before this Court to allow
this case to go to the jury.

I don't believe in all honesty

and fairness, that this man can be convicted based upon the
evidence that I've heard and so I take it away from you and
I have dismissed the case with prejudice.

This case is

over.
I appreciate your being here.

I appreciate your

courtesy, but that's my feeling in this matter and that's a
responsibility that I have under these cases.
If I allowed this case to go to the jury, in my
opinion, and you did convict him, I would be compelled to
set aside your verdict and under those circumstances I can't
conscientiously allow you to take that and go through this
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1 II on the evidence I've heard, so I appreciate your being here,
2 |l but this case is dismissed.
3

Thank you very much.

*

Be sure and talk to the Clerk so you get paid for

5 your allowance.
*

Thank you, folks. I hope that you have a better

7 appreciation for our system under these circumstances and I
8 hope you have an opportunity to see what u/e do and how we
9 act.
io
ii
12

I congratulate counsel for the efforts they've
made, but that's how I see it and that's the way it is.
Thank you very much, folks, and this case and this

13 court will be in recess.
14

[WHEREUPON THE ABOVE ENTITLED PROCEEDINGS WERE

15 COMPLETED]
16 ||
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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